In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and PsychologyArticlesAntonak, R. J., C. R. Fielder, and J. A. Mulick. 1993. A scale of attitudes toward the application of eugenics to the treatment of people with mental retardation. Journal of Intellect Disabilities Research 37:75–83.Arens, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:15–16.Bavidge, M. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, (...) & Psychology 3:29–30.Blashfield, R. K. 1973. Evaluation of the DSM-II classification of schizophrenia as a nomenclature. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85(2):140–150.Braude, S. E. 1996. Multiple personality and moral responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:37–54.Broverman, I. K., S. R. Vogel, D. M. Broverman et al. 1972. Sex-role stereotypes: a current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues 28:59–78.Broverman, I. K., D. M. Broverman, P. E. Clarkson et al. 1975. Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgments of mental health. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 34:1–7.Checkland, D., and M. Silberfeld. 1996. Mental competence and the question of beneficient intervention. Theoretical Medicine 17(2):121–134.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:55–57.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:21–28.Dickenson, D., and D. Jones. 1995. True wishes: The philosophy and developmental psychology of children’s informed consent. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:287–303.Donaldson, T. 1978. Psychoanalyzing the practical inference model. Philosophical Research Archives 4:1215.Eekelaar, J. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:305–307.Fisher, S., and R. P. Greenberg. 1993. How sound is the double-blind design for evaluating psychotropic drugs? Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 181:345–350.Fulwiler, C., and M. F. Folstein. 1995. Commentary on “Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:345–346.Heinze, M. 1995. Commentary on “Moralist or therapist?” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:31–32.Iturrate, M. 1977. Man’s freedom: Freud’s therapeutic goal. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 15:32–45.Littlewood, R. 1991. From diseae to illness and back again. Lancet 337:1013–1015.Maddox, J. 1993. New genetics means no new ethics. Nature 364:97.McCormick, S. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:309–310.Murray, T. H. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:311–312.Muzika, E. G. 1989. Object relations theory, Buddhism, and the self-synthesis of eastern and western approaches. International Philosophical Quarterly 30(1):59–74.Parker, M. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:313–314.Phillips, J. 1996. Key concepts: Hermeneutics. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:61–69.Pole, D. 1970. Self and personality. The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1:30–36.Priebe, S. 1989. On the subjectivity of psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric Praxis 16:86–89.Radden, J. 1996. Lumps and bumps: Kantian faculty psychology, phrenology, and twentieth-century psychiatric classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:1–14.Sampson, E. E. 1981. Cognitive psychology as ideology. American Psychologist 36:730–743.Sarbin, T. R. 1976. Contextualism: A worldview for modern psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 24:1–41.Senft, P. A. 1975. The self-contradictions (antinomies) of psychotherapy: Is a solution in social action possible? The Human Context 7:367–372.Shuman, D. W. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:59–60.Sprigge, T. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:31–36.Wallace, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:17–20.Wells, L. A. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:315–317.Wiggins, O. P., and M. A. Schwartz. 1995. Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology: a critique. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:319–343.BooksAmerican Hospital Association. 1994. Values in conflict: Resolving ethical issues in health care. 2nd ed. Chicago: American Hospital Association.American Medical Association. 1992. Code of medical ethics: Annotated current opinions of the council on ethical and judicial affairs. Chicago: American Medical Association.———. 1994. Council on ethical and judicial affairs... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Crushing Pressures and Radical IdeasJohn Z. Sadler, MD (bio)Back in 2011, I wrote a paper for the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, an Australian journal, for a special issue dedicated to ethical issues associated with psychiatric genetics research. The editor was particularly excited by the recent findings of the 5-HTT allele in psychiatric illness. I had different ideas about what I wanted to write about, and the editor, Michael Robertson, (...) graciously considered them and ultimately published the paper. At the time I was interested in the colossal investment of National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) research dollars in psychiatric genetic research; at the time I was troubled at the lack of on-the-ground clinical implications of this research investment, and figured an Australian journal and referees would be more generous to a critical paper on U.S. funding priorities. I dug into the National Institutes of Health (NIH), NIMH, and National Science Foundation websites and found some crude dollar evidence of respective expenditures for research funding in various disorders and focus areas, and compared these investments to psychiatric genetic research funding commitments. I will not go into details (Sadler, 2011), but the gist was that the psychiatric genetics research enterprise was and had been an extraordinarily expensive enterprise, when other research questions that could be immediately implementable into clinical care improvements remained marginally funded at best. The paper was not read widely and other than a couple of annoyed responses from psychiatric genetic researchers, not much came of it.This concern about funding priorities was one of the reasons why I was pleased to see this paper by Turkheimer and Greer which explores the long term results of the Spit for Science (S4S) initiative, which was launched grandly the same year as my paper’s whisper from down under. I hope this Philosophical Case Conference explores the many dimensions of interest for this paper, which is extraordinarily careful and even handed in its attitude, while at the same time being incisive in its analysis.My focus here is not in the science per se, which is beyond my competence. I’m interested in Turkheimer and Greer’s (T&G) conceptual overview of this research program. More specifically, I focus on T&G’s highlighting of the extraordinary willingness of the S4S authors to interpret prevailingly negative results in the most generous, even misleading, degree possible. I try to provide some possible ways of understanding this kind of research rhetoric exhibited by a cohort of highly respected, very successful scientists.I acknowledge the well-described varieties of interpretive bias that all of us are subject to. First on the list must be confirmation bias, our tendency to interpret situations in terms consistent [End Page 447] with our preconceived notions—in this case, the idea that genetics has something important to do with addictive disorders. Another might be epistemic overconfidence—the tendency to fail at interpretive skepticism in favor of one’s preferred conclusion. Related to this may also be interpretive momentum, the tendency to maintain a conviction about the correctness of one’s expectations and disregard inconsistent findings over the course of a research program—in this case, the multiple S4S studies (O’Sullivan & Schofeld, 2018). However, these kinds of biases tend to “blame” the individual authors’ thinking styles. I opine, though, that other vectors shaping the declaring-success rhetoric are more important.These sources have to do with the state of practice in doing biomedical science research in universities and particularly academic medical centers (AMCs) today. I identify several causal vectors that compel, however subtly, researchers to declare success in the face of failure. I have only picked three, and in no order of importance: 1) funding caps for NIH grants, 2) the overleveraging of university budgets and ballooning dependence on soft money, and 3) the incentivizing of intellectual property development within AMCs.Funding Caps for NIH GrantsIf you are a university or AMC, one way you hold onto your most productive scientists (e.g., grants, publications, discoveries, and status) is by paying them well. Single NIH grants today commonly amount to millions of dollars, and often tens of millions. These bring... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.4 (2005) 307-310 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetics, Criticism, and Psychotherapy John Z. Sadler Keywords aesthetics, psychiatry, psychotherapy, Sibley In his wide-ranging survey of how Kantian aesthetic theory is implicated in psychothera-py, John Callender has raised at least a dozen potentially profound and rewarding possibilities in applying aesthetic theory to psychiatry and psychotherapy. Although the idea of marrying aesthetic theory to psychiatry and (...) psychotherapy is not new, Callender's direction of the merger is distinctively novel. The mid-twentieth century had a distinct literature in applying psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory to aesthetic experience, summarized by the sizable bibliography by Norman Kiell, Psychiatry and Psychology in the Visual Arts and Aesthetics: A Bibliography (1965). This line of interdisciplinary work influenced a later generation of art historians and literary theorists in applying (particularly) psychoanalytic theory to interpretation and appreciation of the arts, contributions that are still being developed today, along with the emergence of complementary viewpoints from cognitive neuroscience (Peretz and Zatorre 2003; Rose 2004; Zeki 1999). Callender's project, however, is quite the converse—he wishes to show how philosophical aesthetics can contribute to psychiatry and clinical psychology. Exploring the aesthetics of psychiatry is the innovation.Before focusing my own comments on a few of Callender's points, I wish to call attention to the substantive questions he has directly raised or implied by his discussions. These questions are worthy of further development in this and other journals, and I hope that Callender will succeed in engaging the minds of his readers and inspire them to work in this exciting area in the philosophy of psychiatry. In his elegant review of Kant's key theoretical points of aesthetics, his discussion provokes us to consider the kinds of evaluations that patients make of themselves (moral? aesthetic? others?), as well as the kinds of evaluations clinicians make in their judgments of psychopathology. Evolutionists may wonder about the adaptive significance of aesthetic capacities (e.g., derivatives of grooming? mating displays?). In presenting Kant's notion of "disinterestedness" or contemplative judgment, readers may wonder about overlap with notions of therapist neutrality and unconditional positive regard. Should therapist relationships with patients be dominated by a similar aesthetic sensibility? What does the aesthetic posture have to do with the therapist posture?Importantly, Callender notes the connections and ambiguities between moral values and aesthetic values. This is borne out in his later discussions of clinical case material (considered again below). He focuses primarily on the duplication of aesthetic and moral values in the same terms of praise (honesty, integrity, originality), but there is no question that aesthetic experiences are had by viewers of art exhibiting perverse or depraved [End Page 307] imagery (consider, for instance, Francis Bacon's "3 Screaming Popes" or, even more extremely, the grotesque staged photographs of Joel-Peter Witkin). The implication here is that (as an example) to understand the aesthetics of sadomasochistic art may help us to understand the psychology of sadomasochistic people.By the time he introduces his case material, Callender has raised the issue of intersubjectivity in aesthetic experience, an experience that may be devoid of discursive cognitive content but may be profound with emotional content, thus challenging tenets of cognitive psychology and psychotherapy. His discussion of cases reflecting elements of Kant's components of aesthetic judgment point toward new ways of understanding psychopathology as disturbances in aesthetic self-appraisal.I would like to return to the problem of moral and aesthetic judgments in psychotherapy and in psychopathology. Dr. Callender presents three cases—a woman who has been traumatized by multiple instances of sexual abuse, a young girl with postpartum depression with fears of losing her child because of bad mothering, and a third patient with anorexia nervosa who demonstrates the typically distorted body self-image. I suggest that the aesthetic nature of these patients' self-judgments is not so clear cut as Callender suggests. His sexual abuse case summary certainly suggests a woman consumed by shame. Because shame is a typical "moral emotion," the question is raised of moral badness being involved in her self-concept as well as, or perhaps... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3.2 (1996) 139-142 Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology Articles Abramowitz, S., C. Abramowitz, C. Jackson et al. 1973. The politics of clinical judgment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 41: 385-391.Audi, R. N. 1972. Psychoanalytic explanation and the concept of rational action. The Monist 56: 444- 464.Barondess, J. A. 1979. Disease and illness--a crucial distinction. American (...) Journal of Medicine 66: 375-376.Barrett, R. J. 1988. Interpretations of schizophrenia. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 12: 357-388.Bechtel, W. 1993. The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies 7: 119-154.Belzen, J. A. 1995. The impact of phenomenology on classical psychiatry: Rümke's position between Jaspers and Kraepelin. History of Psychiatry 6: 349-385.Benda, C. E. 1967. Neuroses of conscience. Journal of Existentialism 7: 425-442.Binns, P. 1995. Commentary on "Contentless consciousness." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2: 61-63.Blankenburg, W. 1980. Phenomenology and psychopathology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11: 50-78.Bloomfield, T. M. 1979. Psychoanalysis: A human science? Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 9: 271-287.Blumenfeld, D. 1972. Free action and unconscious motivation. The Monist 56: 426-443.Boudreaux, G. 1977. Freud on the nature of unconscious mental processes. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7: 1-32.Bracken, P. J. 1995. Beyond liberation: Michael Foucault and the notion of a critical psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 1-13.Brazier, M. 1995. Commentary on "Who should be committable?." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 49-50.Bursztajn, J., and A. Brodsky. 1995. Authenticity and autonomy in the managed-care era: Forensic psychiatric perspectives. Journal of Clinical Ethics 5, no. 3: 237-242.Byrnes, J. F. 1979. Suggestions on writing the history of psychological data. History and Theory 16: 297-305.Campbell, E. J., J. G. Scadding, and R. J. Roberts. 1979. The concept of disease. British Medical Journal 2: 757-762.Carveth, D. 1988. In reply to Eagle's reply on "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 377-378.Chadwick, R. F. 1995. Commentary on "Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 83-84.Christiansen, B. 1964. The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (III). Inquiry 7: 47-79.Davis, M. 1987. Realistic utilitarianism and the social conditions of cognitive psychotherapy. Social Theory & Practice 13: 237-259.Dega, W., et al. 1978. Ethics and mental health: Discussion. Dialectics and Humanism 5: 219-235.Dingle, H. 1949. The logical status of psycho-analysis. Analysis 9: 63-66.Dupeau, J. 1977. Freud and degeneracy. Diogenes Spring: 43-64.Eagle, M. 1988. A reply to Carveth's "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 371-375.Elevitch, B. 1974-75. Reasons, motives and psychoanalysis. Philosophical Forum (Boston) 6: 143- 162.Elliot, P. 1995. Policies, identity, and social change: Contested grounds in psychoanalytic feminism. Hypatia 10: 41-55.Fabrega Jr, H. 1980. The position of psychiatric illness in biomedical theory: A cultural analysis. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5: 145-168.Fisk, G. 1993. Accreditation of psychotherapists. British Journal of Hospital Medicine 50: 437-438.Flynn, B. G. 1985. Reading Habermas reading Freud. Human Studies 8: 57-76.Forrow, L., R. M. Arnold, and J. Frader. 1991. Teaching clinical ethics in the residency years--preparing competent professionals. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16: 93-112.Friedman, M. 1982. Philosophical anthropology and psychotherapy. Philosophical Context 12: 9-19.Galdston, I. 1969. The ontologic foundations of morality. Existential Psychiatry 7: 69-75.Gardner, S. 1995a. Commentary on "Irrationality and the dynamic unconscious." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 175-176.Gardner, S. 1995b. Psychoanalysis, science, and commonsense. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 93-113.Handelsman, M. M. et al. 1995. Does legally mandated consent to psychotherapy ensure ethical appropriateness? The Colorado experience. Ethics and Behavior 5, no. 2: 119-129.Hanlon, M. D. 1977. Commentary on Dunham's "Psychiatry, Sociology and Civil Liberties." Values and Ethics in Health Care 2: 275-278.Heaton, J. M. 1972. Insight in... (shrink)

This chapter introduces the edited volume, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Published in 2013, the centenary of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology, the chapter draws lessons from the last hundred years for the coming century. No predictions are made. Instead, five 'conditions for flourishing' are set out: 1) Particular Problems - the importance of focussing on well-defined particular problems rather than general theory building, 2) Product- orientation - remaining always responsibly product oriented in the specific sense that both sides (...) put in the work necessary to 'go deep' with each other's fields, 3) Partnership - working in partnerships of one kind or another, 4) Process - constant reflection on process based on peer review but leaving scope for the occasional rogue voice to cut innovatively against the grain, and 5) Q - a condition of a different kind, Q is an empirically derived measure of the balance between in-group cohesion and out-group openness required to support creativity. Illustrations are given of how these five conditions for flourishing have underpinned the rapid expansion of philosophy and psychiatry in the closing decades of the twentieth century, and, correspondingly, are also reflected in the Handbook as a whole. Overviews and commentaries on individual contributions to the Handbook are given in extended editorial introductions to each of its eight sections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 4.1 (1997) 91-93 Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Articles Allen, J. F., J. Hallperin, and R. Friend. 1985. Removal and diversion tactics and the control of auditory hallucinations. Behavior Research and Therapy 23:601-605.Baker, H. D. 1995. Psychoanalysis and ideology: Bakhtin, Lacan, and Zizek. History of European Ideas 20:499-504.Bernet, R. 1994. Derrida-Husserl-Freud: The trace of transference. Southern (...) Journal of Philosophy 32 suppl.:141-158.Boden, M. A. 1996. Commentary on "Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:135-136.Castelfranchi, C., and M. Miceli. 1996. Commentary on "Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, no. 2:129-133.Fowes, B. J., and F. C. Richardson. 1996. Why is multiculturalism good? American Psychologist 51, no. 6:609-621.Frith, C. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:91-93.Forde, R. 1996. Inclusion of psychosocial conditions in clinical practice and the problem of medicalization. Theoretical Medicine 17, no. 2:151-161.Gaylin, W., and D. Doukas. 1995. The second-hand suicide threat. Hastings Center Report 25:20-22.Gillet, G. 1995. Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16, no. 3:215-233.Haskell, R. E. 1993. Realpolitik in the addictions field: Treatment-professional, popular-culture ideology, and scientific research. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14, no. 3:257-276.Kuys, T. 1995. The tally argument again. Methodological Science 28, nos. 2-3:43-55.Lear, J. 1995. The heterogeneity of the mental: Sebastian Gardner's irrationality and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 104:863-879.Libet, B. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 3:95-96.Lloyd, D. 1996. Commentary on "Toward a design-based analysis of emotional episodes." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:127-128.Pepper-Smith, R., W. R. C. Harvey, and M. Silberfeld. 1996. Competency and practical judgment. Theoretical Medicine 17, no. 2:135-150. [End Page 91]Spence, S. A. 1996a. Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:75-90.------. 1996b. Response to the commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:99-100.Stein, D. J. 1996. The philosophy of psychopathy. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 39:569-580.Stephens, G. L. 1996. Commentary on "Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:97-98.Varela, C. R. 1995. Ethnogenic theory and psychoanalysis: The unconscious as a social construction and a failed explanatory concept. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 25:4.Weisberger, A. M. 1995. The ethics of the broader usage of Prozac: Social choice or social bias? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 10, no. 1:69-74.Wright, I., A. Sloman, and L. Beaudoin. 1996a. Response to the commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:137.------. 1996b. Towards a design-based analysis of emotional episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3, no. 2:101-126. Books American Psychiatric Association. Task Force on Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization. 1993. Consent to voluntary hospitalization. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.Christiansen, H. D. 1972. Ethics in counseling: Problem situations. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.Clark, P., and C. Wright, eds. 1988. Mind, psychoanalysis and science. New York: Blackwell.Comerchero, V., ed. 1970. Values in conflict: Christianity, marxism, psychoanalysis, existentialism. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.Epstein, R. S. 1994. Keeping boundaries: Maintaining safety and integrity in the psychotherapeutic process. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.Fairbairn, G. J. 1995. Contemplating suicide: The language and ethics of self harm. New York: Routledge.Grubb, A., ed. 1991. Decision-making and problems of incompetence. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Haas, L. J., and J. L. Malouf. 1995. Keeping up the good work: A practitioner's guide to mental health ethics. 2nd ed. Sarasota: Professional Resource Exchange.Hacking, I. 1995. Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the sciences of memory. Princeton: Princeton University... (shrink)

This section concerns the question of how best to understand the scientific status of mental health care in general and psychiatry in particular. On the assumption that psychiatry is based, in part at least, on natural science, what is the nature or the general shape of that science? Some of the chapters aim at shedding light on component parts of a scientific world view: causation, explanation, natural kinds, models of medicine, etc. Others concern potentially fruitful scientific approaches to mental health (...) care, drawing on brain imaging results, phenomenology, enactivism and what can be learnt from debate of the status of psychoanalysis. One overall lesson is that twenty-first-century psychiatry needs twenty-first-century philosophy of science. (shrink)

Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...) thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism. (shrink)

In the individual, social, and political dimensions, the shaping of the liberal tradition has met up with and will continue to meet up with the presence of the Roman Catholic Church with its own philosophy. Yet has this always led to sharp conflict between Catholicism and liberalism? Has the social thinking of the Church evolved in its assessment of the liberal tradition and vice versa? Have there been points in common in the two systems of thinking? In contrast, where have (...) sparks appeared? Does Catholicism support the stability of liberal democracy? A response to these questions comprises the primary aim of the work at hand. Herein is a presentation and appraisal of one of the most interesting and continually lively clashes, accompanied by a portrayal of both Catholicism and liberalism. Analysis will be conducted at the level of social philosophy, through incidental political practice, and from the historical perspective – all of which together will enable illustration of the dynamic relationship between Catholicism and liberalism. Due to the scope of liberalism, the analysis of the Catholicism-liberalism relationship will be limited solely to the philosophy of politics and of economics. Such a restricted social philosophy involves the following issues: the genesis, essence, and characteristics of social policy; its ultimate justification or lack thereof; the relationship between the political society and its members; the types of structured political communities; the genesis, nature and duties of political authorities; the definition of the law, its foundations and limitations; the essence and properties of economic life; types of ownership; and, finally, the relations taking place between politics and economics. The problem inherent in an encounter between the social thinking of the Roman Catholic Church and liberalism appear to be especially meaningful in the context of the Polish discourse regarding the new order, its theoretical bases and institutions, projects for the realization of individual freedom, and the superiority or inferiority of values in today’s pluralistic universe. This matter is of great consequence and significance – not only intellectually but above all practically – and manifests itself in political, economic, and cultural life. Nonetheless, for decades now, Polish research into this issue has been entangled in occasional conflicts of a worldview and political nature. In turn, there is a lack of understanding and objective theoretical reflection on the subject. In fact, there are no publications which attempt to understand liberalism and assess the validity of the accusations against it. The vast amount of literature devoted to this problem most frequently opens, right from the start, with arguments stemming from either a Marxist or Catholic apologetics. The liberal credo is not identified with the philosophy of politics, but rather the theory of pro-capitalist economics. This, as a result, not only misrepresents the crux of liberalism, but also narrows the catalogue of responses by the Church on this very topic – starting with the encyclical Rerum novarum (1891) by Pope Leo XIII. In order to resolve this problem, the analysis will be rooted in the broader philosophical and historical context. In other words, it will look into liberalism on the one hand, and into those Church documents in which that institution first spoke of liberalism on the other. The discussions and deliberations contained within this volume are laid out in an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction includes the theoretical bases and methodological assumptions of this work, taking into account the principles of philosophical reflection and analysis. The fundamental chapters present the evolution of an attitude towards liberalism in the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church – from Pius VI to John Paul II – taking under consideration the key moments and figures in the development of liberalism (e.g., John Locke, John Stuart Mills, John Rawls). In this time period four stages of a Catholic reference to liberalism will be distinguished. The first three constitute: 1) animosity and condemnation (from Pius VI to Pius IX), 2) criticism accompanied by tolerance (from Leo XIII to Pius XII, and 3) criticism accompanied by limited concord (from John XXIII to Paul VI). Today, and with increasing frequency, voices are heard speaking of the teachings of John Paul II as marking a new caesura in the Catholic-liberalism relationship. Hence it is worth re-evaluating and re-analyzing if such opinions are justified. The volume closes with a conclusion comprising an attempt to answer the following questions. Are Catholic accusations addressed at liberalism correct or not? Has liberalism turned out to be a philosophy open to criticism and capable of modification as the weak points in liberal theory and practice are disclosed? Can Catholic values enrich the liberal political order? Can Catholic moral-religious norms, introduced into the realm of political responsibilities, endanger the foundations of the liberal system? Reviewing the evolution of Catholicism as well as liberalism, has Catholicism found its place amidst the pluralistic harmony of liberal democracy? Kształtowanie się tradycji liberalnej napotykało i będzie napotykać na promowaną przez Kościół rzymskokatolicki filozofię, zarówno w wymiarze indywidualnym, społecznym, jak i politycznym. Czy zawsze prowadziło to do ostrego sporu między katolicyzmem a liberalizmem? Czy społeczna myśl Kościoła ewoluowała w swojej ocenie tradycji liberalnej i vice versa? Czy w obu systemach myślowych istniały punkty wspólne? Czego dotyczyły ogniska zapalne? Czy katolicyzm wspiera stabilność liberalnej demokracji? Te pytania sprawiły, że głównym celem niniejszej pracy jest prezentacja i ocena jednego z najbardziej interesujących i wciąż aktualnych sporów, a pośrednio przedstawienie dwóch filozofii – katolicyzmu i liberalizmu. Analiza tego sporu prowadzona jest na płaszczyźnie filozofii społecznej, incydentalnie – praktyki politycznej w ujęciu historycznym, co umożliwia ukazanie dynamiki relacji między katolicyzmem i liberalizmem. Z powodu zakresu liberalizmu w analizie relacji katolicyzm – liberalizm praca ta ogranicza się jedynie do filozofii polityki i filozofii gospodarki. Tak okrojona filozofia społeczna interesuje się następującymi problemami: genezą, istotą i cechami społeczności politycznej, jej ostatecznym uzasadnieniem lub brakiem takowego oraz relacjami między społeczeństwem politycznym a jego członkami, typami ustrukturyzowania wspólnoty politycznej, genezą, naturą i zadaniami władzy politycznej, definicją prawa, jego podstawą i ograniczeniami, istotą i właściwościami życia gospodarczego, rodzajami własności, stosunkami zachodzącymi między polityką a ekonomią. Problem spotkania myśli społecznej Kościoła katolickiego z liberalizmem wydaje się szczególnie znaczący również w kontekście polskich dyskusji o tworzącym się ładzie, jego teoretycznych podstawach i instytucjach, projekcie realizacji indywidualnej wolności oraz wyższości i niższości wartości w dzisiejszym, pluralistycznym uniwersum. Problem ten ma olbrzymie znaczenie nie tylko intelektualne, ale przede wszystkim praktyczne, objawiające się na poziomie życia politycznego, ekonomicznego i kulturowego. Jednak od wielu dziesięcioleci polskie studia nad tym zagadnieniem są uwikłane w doraźne konflikty o charakterze światopoglądowym i politycznym, natomiast brakuje rozumiejącej i obiektywnej refleksji teoretycznej na ten temat. Właściwie nie ma publikacji próbujących zrozumieć liberalizm i ocenić zasadność stawianych mu zarzutów. Ogrom literatury poświęcony temu problemowi najczęściej zawiera prace już na wstępie wychodzące z pozycji apologetycznie marksistowskich czy katolickich. Utożsamia się w nich credo liberalizmu nie z filozofią polityki, lecz z teorią ekonomii prokapitalistycznej, co nie tylko zakłamuje istotę liberalizmu, lecz także zawęża katalog wypowiedzi Kościoła na jego temat, rozpoczynając je od encykliki Rerum novarum (1891) Leona XIII. Aby sprawę wyjaśnić w niniejszej książce, analiza jest umieszczona w szerszym kontekście filozoficznym i historycznym, czyli „ma wgląd”, z jednej strony w liberalizm, z drugiej – w dokumenty Kościoła, w których on po raz pierwszy zabrał głos w sprawie liberalizmu. Rozważania zawarte w niniejszej pracy podzielone są na wstęp, cztery rozdziały i zakończenie. We wstępie prezentuję podłoże teoretyczne i założenia metodologiczne rozprawy, przestrzegając zasad refleksji i analizy filozoficznej. Rozdziały przedstawiają ewolucję stosunku do liberalizmu w społecznej nauce Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego, od czasów Piusa VI do Jana Pawła II, z uwzględnieniem ważniejszych momentów rozwoju myśli liberalnej (John Locke, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls). W omawianym okresie wyróżniam cztery etapy katolickiego odniesienia do liberalizmu: pierwszy – wrogości i potępienia (od Piusa VI do Piusa IX), drugi – krytyki, ale zarazem tolerowania (od Leona XIII do Piusa XII), trzeci – krytyki, choć i ograniczonej zgody (od Jan XXIII do Pawła VI) i czwarty – powszechnie oceniany jako przełom w katolickiej percepcji liberalizmu (pontyfikat Jana Pawła II). Całość rozważań zamknie zakończenie, którego treścią jest próba odpowiedzi na pytania: czy katolickie zarzuty pod adresem liberalizmu są trafne czy też nie? Czy liberalizm okazał się filozofią otwartą na krytykę, zdolną do modyfikacji pod wpływem ujawniania słabych stron teorii lub praktyk liberalnych? Czy wartości katolickie mogą wzbogacić liberalny porządek polityczny? Czy też katolickie normy moralno-religijne, wprowadzone w obręb obowiązków politycznych, zagrażają fundamentom ustroju liberalnego? Czy zarówno wobec ewolucji katolicyzmu, jak i liberalizmu katolicyzm odnalazł się w pluralistycznej harmonii liberalnej demokracji? (shrink)

The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is a key node in the human salience network. It has been ascribed motor, pain-processing and affective functions. However, the dynamics of information flow in this complex region and how it responds to inputs remain unclear and are difficult to study using non-invasive electrophysiology. The area is targeted by neurosurgery to treat neuropathic pain. During deep brain stimulation surgery, we recorded local field potentials from this region in humans during a decision-making task requiring motor output. (...) We investigated the spatial and temporal distribution of information flow within the dACC. We demonstrate the existence of a distributed network within the anterior cingulate cortex where discrete nodes demonstrate directed communication following inputs. We show that this network anticipates and responds to the valence of feedback to actions. We further show that these network dynamics adapt following learning. Our results provide evidence for the integration of learning and the response to feedback in a key cognitive region. (shrink)

This book's importance is derived from three sources: careful conceptualization of teacher induction from historical, methodological, and international perspectives; systematic reviews of research literature relevant to various aspects of teacher induction including its social, cultural, and political contexts, program components and forms, and the range of its effects; substantial empirical studies on the important issues of teacher induction with different kinds of methodologies that exemplify future directions and approaches to the research in teacher induction.

Discutamos el principio de la acción mínima (PMA) y su conexión con el axioma tomista operari sequitur esse. El PMA se llama uno de los principios más profundos de la naturaleza. Después de una exposición breve del principio, pasemos a investigar esto en tres etapas aporéticas. La primera etapa involucra una pregunta de prioridad: ¿el PMA—es una causa o un efecto? En la segunda etapa analizamos la conexión entre un comportamiento global y los individuos a escala local: ¿es el PMA (...) una característica verdadera debido a lo que es cierto acerca de las naturalezas de las sustancias? En la etapa final, relacionamos el PMA al axioma tomista operari sequitur esse. La idea clave es que las formas de los objetos físicos no son simplemente determinaciones intrínsecas sino que también establecen de manera extrínseca varias relaciones. Las formas de los individuos son, a través de estas relaciones esenciales, extrínsecas y determinables, partes formales de un todo cósmico. Esto concuerda con la idea tomista de que la forma del universo—el tipo natural del mundo—es su misma unidad de orden. (shrink)

Joint attention is a social-cognitive phenomenon in which two or more agents direct their attention together towards the same object. Definitions range from this rather broad conception to more specific definitions which require that, in addition, attention be directed to the same aspect of that object and that agents need to be mutually aware of their jointly attending. Joint attention is an important coordination mechanism in joint action. The capacity for engaging in joint attention, in particular in the sense of (...) this narrower definition, is frequently taken to indicate the presence of theory of mind in the participating agents, and is also implicated in the development of theory of mind. However, the prominence of sensorimotor components in establishing and sustaining episodes of joint attention — e.g., eye and head movements, pointing and vocalizations — suggests that sensorimotor approaches to social interaction may be well-placed to account for important parts of joint attention without invoking theory-of-mind abilities, and may therefore provide a valuable alternative to approaches emphasizing theory of mind. In particular, sensorimotor accounts may explain aspects of joint attention through the dynamics and regularities in the sensorimotor processes that coordinate the activities of the agents. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una reflexión sobre la manera en que en los últimos veinte años la promoción de un determinado tipo de solidaridad en Chile ha contribuido a la conformación de una gubernamentalidad liberal avanzada, necesaria para la instalación de un programa neoliberal. La reflexión se enmarca en los aportes teóricos de Michel Foucault y tiene por objeto empírico piezas de publicidad de promoción de la solidaridad emitidas en Chile entre los años 2009 y 2010, que han sido analizadas en (...) el contexto del proyecto Fondecyt 1090534. Se presentan tres tipos de resultados: (a) se describen los sectores sociales que se construyen como agentes de la solidaridad, (b) se reflexiona sobre las prácticas solidarias más promovidas y (c) se indaga en la forma en que se interpela a los sujetos a ser solidarios. (shrink)

La filosofía pragmatista norteamericana ha adquirido en estos últimos tiempos una gran relevancia. En ese contexto destaca particularmente la figura de John Dewey. A partir de la reciente publicación en lengua española de dos de sus obras de filosofía social y política más significativas —Viejo y nuevo individualismo y La opinión pública y sus problemas—, este trabajo repasa sus ideas sobre el individualismo, el liberalismo, la comunidad, la opinión pública y la democracia, sin perder nunca de vista su pertinencia (...) para los problemas y desafíos de nuestros días. (shrink)

Despite the alarming drop in numbers of students studying science throughout the Western world today there is no more important subject in our time than science broadly construed, and these three books provide some of the reasons. Their diversity indicates the shape of the debates occurring about the scientist in Western culture, science's tortured philosophical realism and representation as troubled categories, and, most predictably, life on the screen in the age of the Internet.

The paper is devoted to the question of the principle of individuation in Bl. John Duns Scotus. This question is found in his commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, namely the Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, qu. 13. The first part of the paper discusses problems connected with the chronology and structure of the text, whereas the second one is presented as Scotus’s teaching on individuation. S. Dumont and T. Noone argue today on the traditional thesis about the origin of (...) this question and the remaining philosophical writings from the juvenile stage of Scotus’s philosophical work. They claim that some questions from the In Metaph., including also qu. 13 from the book, were written later or in the same time as the commentaries to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. The authors support their views by indicating the following: 1) the text the In Metaph. is better organised, 2) the vocabulary used with reference to the principle of individuation, especially the term haecceitas, is employed twice in the text In Metaph., 3) the quotations from the later works of Scotus and the works of authors who wrote somewhat later than that date of the In Metaph. hitherto presumed, 4) some stylistic terms indicate that the author of the text was a mature person. The traditional thesis is defended by I. Modrić on behalf of the Scotistic Commission. Having made a detailed analysis, Modrić rejected all the arguments from the introduction to the critical edition of the In Metaph. The author of this paper agrees with Modrić’s view. Therefore as long as we do not have a thesis to the contrary we shall hold the traditional opinion about the earlier origin of the In Metaph. in comparison to Peter Lombard’s commentaries on the Sentences. Scotus opens his lecture on individuation with a discussion of various standpoints on this issue. He divides them into positive and negative theories of individuation. This ordering ensures a clear exposition of various views without unnecessary repetitions and vagueness. Eventually, Doctor Subtilis rejects all hitherto views and provides his own solution. The principle of individuation is for him an individuating entity, the ultimate reality of the individual being. In combination with common nature it determines the most individual of possible characterisation of the individuum. This positive individuating entity is called an individual form (forma individualis) in the In Metaph., a degree of entity (gradus entis) and haecceitas. The latter became a technical term to define the Scotist principle of individuation. (shrink)

A letter from Martin Heidegger.--On the way to being; reflecting on conversations with Martin Heidegger, by Z. Adamczewski.--Heidegger's view and evaluation of nature and natural science, by E. G. Ballard.--Truth as art: an interpretation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (sec. 44) and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, by C. D. Keyes.--The language of the event: the event of language, by T. Kisiel.--Heidegger: the problem of the thing, by T. Langan.--The late Heidegger's omission of the ontic-ontological structure of Dasein, by R. Powell.--Towards (...) the movement of reversal: science, technology, and the language of homecoming, by J. Sallis.--Prolegomena to "Time and being": truth and time, by A. Schuwer.--Cosmos, nature, and man and the foundations of psychiatry, by A.-T. Tymieniecka.--Heidegger and the existential a priori, by J. Wild. (shrink)

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics is a recent addition to anthologies in the field, joining The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, and The Routledge Handbook of Animal Ethics. Edited by Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, the book boasts more than 30 contributors, many of them philosophers, but also including sociologists, scientists, theologians, lawyers, psychologists, and animal advocates. The editors were intentionally multidisciplinary in their approach, noting that “there is currently no book (...) series that is a focus for multidisciplinary research in the field,” and calling attention to the need not only for philosophical inquiry into what we owe animals, but also into the “social, legal, cultural, religious and political” influences that “legitimate animal abuse” (p. viii).The book is divided up into four sections: “The Ethics of Control,” “The Ethics of Captivity,” “The Ethics of Killing,” and “The Ethics of Causing Suffering.” Each of these sections includes an editorial introduction and multiple entries spanning diverse issues, including animal research, animal agriculture, hunting, fishing, zoos, the role of animals in religion, the role of language in structuring thought about nonhuman animals, and others. Similarly, the chapters span issues affecting many species, including farmed animals, fish, deer, elephants, whales and dolphins, rodents, companion animals (e.g., dogs and cats), and others.While the book is billed as a “practical” handbook of animal ethics, it does wade into some conceptual territory, tackling such issues as the ethical permissibility of confining and controlling animals, the question of whether (painless) death harms nonhuman animals, and the comparative wrongness of killing humans and nonhuman animals. This said, it largely stays away from more detailed discussion of normative ethical theory and the moral standing of nonhuman animals, focusing instead on the specific ways that humans treat nonhuman animals. In focusing more on practical than theoretical ethics, the Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics both complements and differentiates itself from some other anthologies in the field.The book has several strengths to recommend it, the first being the logic of its organization. The ethically problematic aspects of humans’ treatment of nonhuman animals frequently map onto one or more of the categories of causing suffering, killing, and confining. The organization of chapters under these section headings helps to provide a rational structure to the text, as well as an easy way for the reader to navigate which sections they would like to tackle first (although there is some overlap between sections). With this, the explicit and sustained focus on the ethics of control (section 1) is a welcome and differentiating feature of the text. Much prior work in animal ethics has addressed questions of harming and killing animals, but the ethical permissibility of control per se has received comparatively lesser attention.The multidisciplinary nature of the book is also a selling point. In any anthology on animal ethics, the reader can expect entries from academic philosophers, but the book's inclusion of empirical scientific reviews, sociological and legal analyses, and work in discourse analysis are strengths. One danger in focusing exclusively on what we ought to think and do is that it ignores the influences on how we actually think and act. Many of the book's entries address these influences and thus round out the normative analysis.The middle two sections of the book seem most successful to this reviewer. The section on the ethics of killing contains two well-argued conceptual chapters, coupled with practical analyses of fishing, deer hunting, and religious perspectives on killing nonhuman animals. While animal research and animal agriculture are not directly addressed in this section, the conceptual arguments can be applied to the killing of nonhuman animals in these contexts. The section on the ethics of captivity is not as conceptually strong but contains excellent empirical chapters on the welfare of elephants, whales, and dolphins in captivity. Prior work in normative ethics has established how confinement can be harmful to nonhuman animals by directly causing suffering or depriving them of opportunities for satisfaction (see, e.g., DeGrazia, 2002). However, it is important to complement such theoretical frameworks with substantiation of how captivity actually is harmful to nonhuman animals in virtue of the interests they have and how captivity infringes upon such interests. These chapters argue that captivity is fundamentally (and not conditionally) incompatible with the welfare of elephants, whales, and dolphins.If I have one criticism of the book, it is that it could be stronger on certain conceptual issues. Acknowledging its practical and not theoretical focus, it is nonetheless true that if controlling, confining, killing, and causing suffering to nonhuman animals is wrong, then it is important to say something about why it is wrong—even if that explanation amounts to a short synopsis of more theoretical work done elsewhere. While the question of killing is addressed well, the section on the ethics of causing suffering does not address directly why (or under what conditions) causing suffering is wrong. The chapters in this section are worthwhile reading and review practices causing animal suffering in a variety of contexts. Nonetheless, some additional conceptual front matter would have strengthened the section overall.From a conceptual standpoint, the sections on the ethics of control and captivity seem to hang together. Confinement is a form of control and might be argued against on the grounds that it deprives nonhuman animals of opportunities for satisfaction, directly causes physical injury, or causes psychological distress, anxiety, or boredom. These kinds of arguments fit into interest-based accounts of animal welfare, which in turn can be subsumed under a principle of nonmaleficence: We should not cause harm to animals under some specified set of conditions; confinement harms animals in ways x, y, or z; therefore, we should not confine animals in this way.While such interest-based arguments do make an appearance in the text, several of the book's authors also elaborate an autonomy-based argument against control and confinement: Nonhuman animals have their own kind of autonomy, and just as infringing upon the autonomy of paradigmatic persons is wrong, infringing upon nonhuman animals’ autonomy is also wrong. The problem with this argument is that different kinds of autonomy are likely to be at stake. The wrongness of infringing upon paradigmatic persons’ autonomy is often explained by the facts that we are self-conscious, capable of abstract thought (including language use), and capable of intentionally choosing the kind of life that we want to live (e.g., relating to long-term projects or schemes of personal ethics). It could be argued that because nonhuman animals are not capable of exercising this kind of autonomy, they therefore cannot be harmed by its infringement.Some of the book's authors chip away at this presumption, noting (inter alia) that nonhuman animals have desires to move around and do things that are thwarted by confinement or control, that these desires constitute a form of agency, and that (following previous scholarship) nonhuman animals possess some forms of self-awareness. Specifically, the chapters from Valéry Giroux and Carl Saucier-Bouffard, Lori Gruen, and Carlos Naconecy consider such arguments. Naconecy draws upon David DeGrazia's (2009) analysis of animal self-awareness in making his argument. Though the issue deserves more treatment than I can give it here, it seems that nonhuman animals’ autonomy and self-awareness, even if granted, are of a different sort than that possessed by paradigmatic persons. Specifically, (most) nonhuman animals cannot feel wronged by having their preferences overridden because they are not the kinds of beings who are capable of abstractly considering themselves as autonomous and worthy of self-direction. They may desire things, and thwarting these desires might sometimes harm them, but that is a different kind of argument.Infringing upon nonhuman animals’ (more limited kind of) autonomy might nonetheless be wrong, but if different sorts of autonomy are at stake, then moral arguments relating to paradigmatic persons cannot be directly transposed to nonhuman animals. Some additional argument(s) must be supplied, but (on my reading) the book's contributors stop short of this. Nonetheless, as stated above, the ethics of control and questions of nonhuman animals’ autonomy are not as well trod as other issues in animal ethics. Despite my taking issue with some of the details, the discussions contained in the book's first two sections are worthy reading and help to advance the field.Overall, the book's chapters are well written and cogently argued, and given its breadth, different readers will find different things to value in it. The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics is a welcome addition to the literature. (shrink)

Autor twierdzi, że nieśmiertelność niekoniecznie musi być aż tak zła, jak to opisuje Bernard Williams. Twierdzi on, że jeśli nieśmiertelne życie charakteryzowałoby się wystarczająco zróżnicowanym pakietem doświadczeń, odpowiednio podzielonych, nie ma powodu, by sądzić, że ktoś będzie się nudził. Przyznaje, że niektóre z przyjemnych doświadczeń „same ulegają wyczerpaniu”, ale mówi, że nie ma wystarczającej liczby powtarzalnych „przyjemności”, aby ulec nudzie, o której mówi Bernard Williams.

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter (“semantics”) of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches (e.g. justifying principles by appeal to obviousness, common usage, etc.) fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation (...) never arises. This rebuts several standard objections to money-pump and Dutch book arguments. However, because one can only appeal to relevantly similar decision situations in pragmatic arguments, these will have a less general scope than is often imagined. A conclusion is that pragmatic arguments for strong unconditional principles such as ‘always maximise expected utility!’ do not work. Pragmatic considerations can however be used to argue for conditional principles of the form ‘if conditions X, Y and Z are satisfied, then one ought to satisfy W’, where W need not follow logically from X, Y and Z.The notion of a sound pragmatic argument is defined in terms of particular notion of coherence, it is shown how this can be applied and how it handles problematic cases such as van Fraassen’s Dutch book for the principle of Reflection. (shrink)

This collection of thirteen essays, when viewed together, offers a unique perspective on the history of American philosophy. It illuminates for the first time in book form, how thirteen major American philosophical thinkers viewed a problem of special interest in the American philosophical tradition: the relationship between experience and reflection. Written by well-known authorities on the figure about which he or she writes, the essays are arranged chronologically to highlight the changes and developments in thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism to (...) Process Philosophy. While Doctrine and Experience will be of particular interest to specialists in American Philosophy, there is also much to offer anyone interested in the intellectual and cultural history of the United States. In order of appearance, the essays are: "Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening" by John E. Smith "Heart and Head: The Mind of Thomas Jefferson" by Andrew J. Reck"Emerson and the American Future" by Robert C. Pollock"Chauncey Wright and the Pragmatists" by Edward Madden"Charles S. Peirce: Action Through Thought – The Ethics of Experience" by Vincent G. Potter"Life Is in the Transitions’: Radical Empiricism and Contemporary Concerns" by John J. McDermott"John Dewey and the Metaphysics of American Democracy" by Ralph W. Sleeper"Individualization and Unification in Sartre and Dewey" by Thelma Z. Levine"Josiah Royce: Anticipator of European Existentialism and Phenomenology" by Jacqueline Ann K. Kegley"The Transcendence of Materialism and Idealism in American Thought" by John Lachs"C. I. Lewis and the Pragmatic Tradition in American Philosophy" by Sandra Rosenthal"The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead" by David Miller"Existence as Transaction: A Whiteheadian Study of Causality" by Elizabeth Kraus. (shrink)

This long-standing series provides the guild of religion scholars a venue for publishing aimed primarily at colleagues. It includes scholarly monographs, revised dissertations, Festschriften, conference papers, and translations of ancient and medieval documents. Works cover the sub-disciplines of biblical studies, history of Christianity, history of religion, theology, and ethics. Festschriften for Karl Barth, Donald W. Dayton, James Luther Mays, Margaret R. Miles, and Walter Wink are among the seventy-five volumes that have been published. Contributors include: C. K. Barrett, Francois Bovon, (...) Paul S. Chung, Marie-Helene Davies, Frederick Herzog, Ben F. Meyer, Pamela Ann Moeller, Rudolf Pesch, D. Z. Phillips, Rudolf Schnackenburgm Eduard Schweizer, John Vissers. (shrink)

Bilim ve felsefe, gerçekliğin doğasını anlamlandırma araştırması olarak betimlenebilir. Hatta bazen bu iki alan karşı karşıya getirilerek, bilimin başarısının felsefenin geçerliliğini baltaladığını öne sürerler. Ancak aranılan türden bir anlayış veya açıklama ile ilgilenmek farklı bir tablo sunar: Uygulandığı şekliyle çağdaş fizik bazen dünyanın net bir fiziksel açıklamasını sağlamakta başarısız olur. Einstein, Schrödinger ve John Bell tarafından ifade edilen standart kuantum teorisine yönelik memnuniyetsizliğin temelinde bu yatmaktadır. Bir örnek olarak, Schrödinger’in ünlü kedi örneğinin yakından incelenmesi fizikçilerin genellikle onun asıl amacını (...) kaçırdığını göstermektedir. Felsefi bir eğilimin katkıda bulunabileceği şey, alternatif fizik değil, matematiksel bir biçimcilikten fiziksel bir resim çıkarmak için gerekli olan argümana gösterilen özendir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE UNITY OF THE VICES JONATHAN JACOBS Oolgate University, Hamilton, New York JOHN ZEIS Oanisius Ooilege, Buffalo, New York W:E SOMETIMES describe someone 1rus "just plain,, ' ' • • 0 " ' ' • • mean, or Just plam d1shonesit, orr JUSt pJam unw." Or we say" thaJt wrus ·a just plain ·stupid thing rto do.," G~a:liizing from tlhese and lik!e descriiptions, we can ask, are there (...) any "just plain" vices? By this I mean, are :amy vices pure, 1e.g., can rthere he Cl'lllelty hut nort injustice or in!t:Jempertance, intemperance hut no!t a £ailill'e orf pmctical wisdom, cowardice but not intemperance or injustice, and so on? Is therie perhaps a unity of the vices? Is each ;a col'l'IU!ption thrat involves the coITUpiting ctontriburtion of the othe'l'IS? If there is,a, run:iity of the vicies, then 1be:inig ra vicious individual is Il!Ort siinply 1a ma!bter o:f failing :across the dimensioill of one or rrunothe.r 1 Cihaa:iae1becisltic. ]t ms tan extensi,ve diaiilure, 1a unified (:if l[JIOrt toit.al) failure, even if it is most evident 1and preVialent in one or another •specific respecit. 'f1his iis not to isay thrut.theiie is just one vice,.any moil'!e 1than '!Jo.endorse the unity of it.he virtues is to reduce tth:em to Ollle. There.are many woes OOlld many virrbues, eaiCh respeotively h!ruving to do with dillemnt 1and variously!l'le1aibed crupacirties, motives, emotions, and tiiaiits. Yet, rut least with respect to the virtues a good caise can be mrude :that they.are unified, aind thrut ·AnisbotLe was oorrreot in concluding that practical wisdom :and viWtues of cha;riacter mum occur st quite 1 s1tably, even if '1llolt happily. In any case, we ail"e in 1 to:tal ag.rteemelllt with Geach when he 1sayis 1that ithaJt "If 1a man's ha1bit of sound moml judgme1J11t is virtiiafod anyiwhere, then :it is at risk eVierywhere; but not all dangel"s issue in disa1sit1e'f!s." 3 But 1thes1e dis1as!ters arie aV1eTted r.not because of,any moml str1ength of characil:er 1 th:ait the agent 1truly ihas bUJt heca:us1 e of a me11e inc1ilJJaition tues. 'Ilhe former may he very :firm ox srtable. Mo11eover the n:aituil'ally vi11tuous rindividual may giener1a1ly no1t he oornfused or.impeded maction by "b.ar:d easies" or nnvelty. Alt times he rmay, 1and lthien me may find his re1sourroes iinoompe1be!I1t O'I.' unoel 'l:Ja1in in 1bhreir direetives. Hut the main rpo:inlt of co111iCT'last is thait mo11al virtues 11eflieot 1a 1evel of 1agency wh1oh involves undersitanding 1and self-determin1ation engiaged 1 to t:hat undersltanding, 1a 1leviel tihJait tis 1ruhsen1t foom iinc1ination-grounded action. Na,tu11a1l vri:r1tues 1a1rie ll101t to he despised, 1 and 1aclts :thait fLorw 1f110m 1tJhem 1are not w:iithout moml Wiortlh. But, using the fangiuiage of Fr1a:nk£u:rt, mom1l virtues are oha1racter]s,tios thait refiecrt second order volitions.5 The aiotis: thait flow fil1om them •are not H11e reis:ult of ways one just hrupens to be. And the undeil'-,starnding involvred in moml vrntues makes mo'ral misdireotion 1 1es;s li1"ely. Again, mnswder suoh t.lrings rus mis1applied oomprussfon, or paiti:errce, whioh can involve u1mairness 1and imprudence. P1 errharpis it.is heoausie rbhe mo:rial V1mtueis rare unified that it is 1so hard to rbe 1good. They invo1vie a complex reperrto:We of judgmenits, d1sposi!tiorrs, and moti¥es. No one of them can he oomp1ete on its own, and wie c1an't oome to have 1 tJhem simply 1hy decis1on. One oan til.'y rbo he move coumgeous bU1t caill't ibring it rubout meriely hy init1emal eommanid. Self-imposrutiion in5 In " Freedom of the Will and 'The Concept of a Person," H. Frankfurt writes, "Someone has a desire of the second order when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires "secondorder volitions" or " volitions of the second order." Now it is having... (shrink)

Proponents of the dominant contemporary model of corporate governance maintain that the shareholder is the primary constituent of the firm. The responsibility for managerial decision makers in this governance system is to maximize shareholder wealth. Neoclassical economists ethically justify this objective with their interpretation of Adam Smith's notion of the Invisible Hand. Using a famous quotation from The Wealth of Nations, they interpret the Invisible Hand as Smith's (An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen (...) & Co., London) assertion that market participants, in pursuing their own self-interests without regard to the interests of others, will collectively provide the optimal economic benefit to society. We argue that the traditional interpretation of Smith is too narrow and potentially harmful to society. In order to fully understand Smith's notion of the influence of the Invisible Hand on human behavior, one must also consider The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In that work, Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, A. Millar, London) portrays the pursuit of self-interest as only one of several potential motivations for human action. He also acknowledged the existence of a “sympathy principle,” which refers to the ability and propensity of human beings to consider the interests of others. Heilbroner (The Essential Adam Smith, W.W. Norton, New York, p. 59) suggests that Smith's sympathy principle allows one to “determine the appropriate degree of self-interest, the proper display of benevolence, the desirable strictness of justice.” In fact, Smith indicates that (1) a society whose members pursue self-interest without a sense of justice will eventually collapse; (2) a society whose members pursue self-interest checked by their sense of justice alone will survive; (3) a society whose members pursue self-interest, justice, and the interests of others will flourish. Since a more complete reading of Smith indicates that human beings, in considering their own interests, also reflexively consider the interests of others when making decisions, then the traditional corporate governance model appears to be lacking. A broader, multiple stakeholder approach to corporate governance that considers the interests of other constituencies may be more consistent with Smith's views. In particular, Smith's sympathy principle provides a theoretical foundation for a shift away from the narrow, yet dominant, shareholder-based corporate governance model and toward multiple stakeholder models of corporate governance [e.g., Business and Society: A Strategic Approach to Corporate Citizenship, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA] and internal decision-making [e.g., Sloan Management Review 38, (1997) 25–37]. (shrink)

Discovery of temporal association patterns, temporal association rules from temporal databases is extensively studied by academic research community and applied in various industrial applications. Temporal association pattern discovery is extended to similarity based temporal association pattern discovery from time-stamped transaction datasets by researchers Yoo and Sashi Sekhar. They introduced methods for pruning through distance bounds, and have also introduced SEQUENTIAL and SPAMINE algorithms for pattern mining that are based on snapshot data scan and lattice data scan strategies respectively. Our previous (...) research introduced algorithms G-SPAMINE, MASTER, Z-SPAMINE for time profiled association pattern discovery. These algorithms applied distance measures SRIHASS, ASTRA, and KRISHNA SUDARSANA for similarity computations. SEQUENTIAL, SPAMINE, G-SPAMINE, MASTER, Z-SPAMINE approaches are all based on snapshot and lattice database scan strategies and prunes temporal itemsets by making use of lower bound, upper bound support time sequences and upper-lower distance bound, lower bound distance values. The major limitation of all these algorithms is their inevitability to eliminate dataset scanning process for knowing true supports of itemsets and essential need to have dataset available in memory. To eliminate the requirement of retaining dataset in main memory, algorithms VRKSHA and GANDIVA are two pioneering research contributions that introduced tree structure for time profiled temporal association mining. VRKSHA is based on snapshot tree scan technique while GANDIVA is a lattice tree scan based approach. VRKSHA and GANDIVA both apply Euclidean distance function, but they do not estimate support and distance bounds. This research introduces the pioneering work ULTIMATE that uses a novel tree structure. The tree is generated using similarity measure ASTRA. ULTIMATE uses support bound and distance bound computations for pruning temporal patterns. Experiment results showed that ULTIMATE outperforms SEQUENTIAL, SPAMINE, G-SPAMINE, MASTER, VRKSHA, GANDIVA algorithms. (shrink)

The public, mental health consumers, as well as mental health practitioners wonder about what kinds of values mental health professionals hold, and what kinds of values influence psychiatric diagnosis. Are mental disorders socio-political, practical, or scientific concepts? Is psychiatric diagnosis value-neutral? What role does the fundamental philosophical question "How should I live?" play in mental health care? In his carefully nuanced and exhaustively referenced monograph, psychiatrist and philosopher of psychiatry John Z. Sadler describes the manifold kinds of values and (...) value judgements involved in psychiatric diagnosis and classification systems like the DSM. Professor Sadler takes the reader on a fascinating conceptual tour of the inner workings of psychiatric diagnosis, considering the role of science, culture, sexuality, politics, gender, technology, human nature, patienthood, and professions in building his vision of a more humane psychiatric diagnostic process. (shrink)

Medicalization has been a process articulated primarily by social scientists, historians, and cultural critics. Comparatively little is written about the role of bioethics in appraising medicalization as a social process. The authors consider what medicalization means, its definition, functions, and criteria for assessment. A series of brief case sketches illustrate how bioethics can contribute to the analysis and public policy discussion of medicalization.

Tomasz z Akwinu nie kojarzy się w pierwszym odruchu z kimś, kto kładłby mocny akcent na teologię Boga uniżonego we wcieleniu i na krzyżu. Tak przynajmniej wydaje się wielu współczesnym teologom, zwłaszcza tym, którzy są przedstawicielami szeroko rozumianego nurtu kenotycznego. Według nich Akwinata jest przykładem myśliciela, w którego teologii absolutność Boga, Jego transcendencja, niezmienność, suwerenność i potęga zostały tak mocno podkreślone, że ma to wręcz uniemożliwiać adekwatne uchwycenie zdumiewającej prawdy objawionej w Chrystusie: Bóg jest Bogiem uniżającym siebie samego. Zatem, zdaniem (...) wielu współczesnych teologów, proponowana przez Tomasza wizja Boga ma więcej wspólnego ze skonstruowaną za pomocą metafizyki filozoficzną doktryną Absolutu niż z Bogiem, który stał się człowiekiem i umarł na krzyżu dla naszego zbawienia. Czy jednak zarzut ten jest słuszny? Czy Akwinata rzeczywiście nie dostrzega uniżenia Boga? Właśnie z próby odpowiedzenia na te pytania zrodziła się niniejsza książka. Ze Wstępu. (shrink)

Background: The development of a profession’s autonomy closely relates to that profession’s level of autonomy in performing its specific role. For the nursing profession, this key role is nursing care. Objectives: This study was undertaken to evaluate the professional autonomy of nurses in care provision, from an ethical perspective. Research design: A mixed methods approach is employed in this research, which makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative dimension of this research covers sociodemographic aspects and makes use (...) of the Sociotropy–Autonomy Scale. The qualitative dimension of the research relates to the factors that affect professional autonomy in nursing care. Participants and research context: The sample consisted of 30 nurses working in the orthopedics, neurology, or intensive care units of three hospitals. Ethical considerations: Before conducting this research, we received permission from the ethical committee, as well as written permits from all the institutions in which the research was carried out. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Findings: According to the findings of this study, only 6.7% of the nurses surveyed stated that nurses had professional autonomy; they also stated that professional autonomy in nursing was mostly restricted by the need to be “dependent upon the physician in nursing implementations” and that autonomy in nursing care was mostly limited by a “high number of patients per nurse.” Discussion: This study determined that delays in resolving problems with regard to professional autonomy in nursing care in Turkey could be creating many of the professional and ethical problems that nurses face there. Conclusion: It is recommended that: individuals choose the nursing profession conscientiously; nurses need to be given professional awareness; their professional organizations need to be strengthened; and plans need to be made to increase research and to accumulate both knowledge and expertise. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics is the most comprehensive treatment of the field in history. The volume is organized into ten sections which survey the scope of the text: Introduction, People Come First, Specific Populations, Philosophy and Psychiatric Ethics, Religious Contexts of Psychiatric Ethics, Social Contexts of Psychiatric Ethics, Ethics in Psychiatric Citizenship and the Law, Ethics of Psychiatric Research, Ethics and Values in Psychiatric Assessment and Diagnosis, Ethics and Values in Psychiatric Treatment. Written and edited by an international (...) team of experts, this landmark book provides a powerful and compelling review of psychiatric ethics in the 21st Century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 295 [Access article in PDF] Agency, Narrative, and Self:A Philosophical Case Conference John Z. Sadler and K. W. M. Fulford This issue of PPP features our second "philosophical case conference," which addresses three important and interrelated concepts in the philosophy of psychiatry. Our first philosophical case conference (Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology Volume 5, Number 2, 1998) featured detailed case material concerning the (...) manifold issues involved in psychiatric euthanasia. For this issue, guest edited by J. Melvin Woody, the rich cases supplied by Lloyd Wells provide the foundation for a discussion of narrative accounts of the self and what it means to be an agent.Philosophical case conferences are an occasional feature of PPP, and develop topics to satisfy one or more criteria: to provide discussions that are important to clinical practice or research, to embed current or perennial philosophical debates in the nitty gritty of clinical practice and personal experience, and/or to provide a clinical testing ground for new conceptual developments relevant to the philosophy of psychiatry.The format for this issue involves four feature articles, the first by Wells, presenting detailed case material of several patients, followed by discussions (by Kennett & Matthews, Phillips, and Woody) inspired by, or addressing explicitly, the philosophical questions implied in such cases. Following these four feature articles, a panel of commentators (Glas, Hardcastle, Radden, Thornton, Weiner, Woodbridge) respond to the four feature articles as they wish, providing the variations on the agency, narrative, and self themes. We think you will find this issue of PPP to be a fine example of what the philosophy of psychiatry can do, and we give our abundant thanks to Mel Woody for putting this issue together.... (shrink)

This piece is a book review of Bever, Carroll and Miller's "Talking Minds".